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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines whether the effect of funding through internal capital markets on investment efficiency is 
differentiated by the incentives of controlling shareholders as measured by the divergence between cash flow rights 
and voting rights of controlling shareholders (hereafter, wedge).  
 
To empirically analyze hypotheses of this study, 1,189 firm-year observations were collected from Korean firms listed 
on the Korea Composite Stock Price Index (KOSPI) belonging to a large business group designated by the Korea Fair 
Trade Commission over the period from 2005 to 2012. The results of the analysis are as follows.  
 
 First, we find that the magnitude of internal funding, as measured by total payables to the related parties, is positively 
(+) associated with investment inefficiency. Second, the interaction variables of total payables to the related parties 
and the wedge have a significant positive (+) effect on investment inefficiency. In other words, the deterioration of 
investment efficiency due to the increase in total payables to the related parties was mainly caused by firms with a big 
wedge. This result suggests that the effect of internal capital markets on investment efficiency of large business groups 
may be differentiated by the wedge that is proxy of the controlling shareholder’s incentive.  
 
This study provides additional evidence on previous studies on the investment efficiency of large business groups by 
considering both the internal capital market and incentives for funding using the internal capital market, which are 
important factors affecting the investment of large corporate groups. Also, the results of this study are expected to 
provide implications for the regulatory policy of large business groups which have recently become an issue in Korea. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
raditionally, large business groups in Korea have been criticized for concentration of economic power, 
collusive link between politics and business, and maximizing wealth of controlling shareholders (Yim, 
Lee & Hwang, 2014). On the other hand, there is a growing interest in the large business groups in the 
form of ownership management, arguing that aggressive investment by investment banks, one of the causes of the 
global financial crisis in 2008, is caused by the problem of agents of professional managers. It has also been argued 
that the development of the Korean economy is due to the long-term and bold investment by large business groups 
(Lee, Kim & Lee, 2010; Yim et al. 2014). As result of, the impact of large business groups on the Korean economy 
can be viewed as significant. Therefore, the study on the investment decision making of the large business groups is 
very important. 
 
Important characteristic of the large business groups is the existence of internal capital market (Park & Jung, 2011). 
Large business groups can be financed within the business group if external funding is difficult or unavailable, or 
funding costs are high because of the existence of internal capital markets (Shin & Park, 1999). In addition, if a long-
term profitable business is temporarily insolvent, it can continue its business activities by providing funds through the 
T 
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internal capital market. In other words, risk diversification can be achieved not only among firms but also over time 
through internal capital markets (Bae, Lim & Wei, 2006). 
 
There are two theoretical perspectives concerning the inducement of large business group' funding through the use of 
internal capital market (Yoon, 2004). First, in the presence of information asymmetry, the internal capital market can 
be a positive incentive to increase the efficiency of the group as a whole and to increase the profit of each affiliate. In 
other words, the use of internal funds transactions can avoid information asymmetry existing in the external financial 
market, thereby increasing the efficiency of fund allocation funds to the entire business group (Alchian, 1969). It can 
provide low-cost funding opportunities for affiliates that need funding (Khanna & Palepu, 2000). In this case, if the 
controlling shareholder of the large business group possesses information superiority compared with outside investors, 
it can allocate funds to affiliates with favorable investment opportunities and allocate funds efficiently from the groups’ 
perspective (Stein, 1997). From the viewpoint of agent theory, there is the possibility that the internal capital market 
may contain structural inefficiency. Through the internal capital market, there can be ‘socialist subsidies’ in which 
business opportunities with low investment opportunities and low productivity are funded by business units with 
excellent investment opportunities (Scharfstein & Stein, 2000; Rajan, Servaws & Zingales, 2000). In emerging 
markets where the ownership structure is complex due to the pyramid structure or cross-shareholding, there is also the 
possibility that the internal capital market will deepen the agent problem between controlling shareholders and 
minority shareholders (Claessens, Djankov, Fan & Lang, 2002). In other words, the resources of the business group 
can be transferred to businesses and affiliates that maximize the private utility of the controlling shareholder. This 
implies that the internal fund transaction by large business groups may be conducted to maximize utilities of 
controlling shareholders at the expense of minority shareholders (Yoon, 2004). 
 
As previously discussed, there are conflicting views on the internal fund transactions of the large business group. 
Therefore, it is expected that the efficiency of internal capital markets, which is one of the important characteristics 
of large business groups, will differ depending on ex ante incentives of controlling shareholders. This study examines 
the role of internal capital markets of large business groups in terms of investment efficiency from the perspective of 
the incentives of controlling shareholders. Specifically, we analyzed whether the effect of size of funding through 
large internal capital markets on investment efficiency is differentiated by the incentives of controlling shareholders, 
as measured by the divergence between cash flow rights and voting rights of controlling shareholders (hereafter, 
wedge). 
 
Previous studies have reviewed the efficiency of internal capital markets in relation to investment efficiency, but have 
presented mixed results. In addition, most prior studies do not directly consider the role of the internal capital market, 
which may affect the investment efficiency of a large business group. Even if the existence of the internal capital 
market is considered, it seems that the controlling shareholders do not properly distinguish ex ante incentive to use 
the internal capital market. As noted in Yoon (2004), it is vital to understand ex ante motivation in judging the 
efficiency of internal fund transactions. Therefore, it is necessary to consider both the existence of the internal capital 
market, which is expected to have a significant influence on the investment of the large business group, and ex ante 
incentives of controlling shareholders to use internal capital markets. In this study, we investigated the effects of the 
internal capital market of the large business group on investment efficiency through total payables to the related 
parties. We also analyze whether these effects are differentiated according to ex ante incentives of controlling 
shareholder represented by the wedge.1 
 
To empirically analyze our hypotheses, we used 1,189 firm-year observations collected from Korean firms listed on 
the Korea Composite Stock Price Index (KOSPI) belonging to a large business group designated by the Korea Fair 
																																								 																				
1 On December 21, 2015, the Korean economic magazine ‘Invest Chosun’ reported the following article on the impact of large business group 
funding through internal capital markets on investment.  
'Hanwha Group to develop defense products, change Hanwha Group's presence: Hanwha Group has begun to put more emphasis on the defense 
industry. The company is expanding its efforts to mobilize cash through the reorganization of related affiliates and the sale of assets. It is not 
uncommon for high-quality affiliates to play a major role in funding this process. Hanwha Chemical, whose earnings have improved dramatically, 
is also emerging as one of those . . .  There is a similar precedent. Hanwha Life Insurance, a leading subsidiary, provided a total of 520billion won 
(about $432 million) in 2011 and 2013 through the purchase of real estate including Hanwha Chemical headquarters building, buildings, and 
attached land . . . .  Analyst at one brokerage said that several affiliated companies with cash have funded other affiliates so far, and explained that 
Hanwha Chemical could not exclude Hanwha's expansion of its defense business in terms of funding.  
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Trade Commission over the period from 2005 to 2012. The results of the analysis are as follows. First, we find that 
the magnitude of internal funding, as measured by total payables to the related parties, is positively (+) associated with 
investment inefficiency. Second, the interaction variables of total payables to the related parties and the wedge have a 
significant positive (+) effect on investment inefficiency. In other words, the deterioration of investment efficiency 
due to the increase in total payables to the related parties was mainly caused by firms with a big wedge.  
 
This result suggests that the effect of internal capital markets on investment efficiency of large business groups may 
be differentiated by the wedge that is proxy of the controlling shareholder’s incentives. In other words, the controlling 
shareholders of a companies with a big wedge has stronger control over the company but less liability, which makes 
it easier for them to pursue their own interests (Bebchuk, Reinier & Triantis, 2000; Kim & Yi, 2006; Lee, 2013). It is 
interpreted that this financial support reduce the investment efficiency by being used for constructive investment of 
empire irrelevant to firm value or private use of controlling shareholder. Meanwhile, if the controlling shareholder has 
the cash flow right corresponding to the voting right because the wedge is low, the level of consensus with the external 
minority shareholder becomes greater. Therefore, unlike the group with a big wedge, it seems that funding through 
the internal capital market does not lead to inefficient investment. 
 
This study provides additional evidence to previous studies concerning the investment efficiency of large business 
groups by taking into account the internal capital market, which is an important factor influencing the investment of 
large business groups and by considering the incentives for funding using the internal capital market. In addition, the 
results of this study are expected to provide implications for the regulatory policy of large business groups, which 
have recently become a prominent issue in Korea. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the literature and presents the hypotheses used in this 
paper. In Section III, we describe our methodology. We present descriptive statistics and the results of the empirical 
test in Section Ⅳ. SectionⅤconcludes with implications and study limitations.  
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1 Literature Review 
 
2.1.1 Internal Capital Market of Large Business Groups 
 
One of the most important characteristics of large business groups is the existence of an internal capital market. Park 
and Jung (2011) examined the internal capital market as well as efficient transactions through vertical integration as a 
special function that large groups of companies feature compared to independent firms. If external financing is difficult 
to obtain or the financing cost is high, it is possible to raise capital from affiliates belonging to business groups (Shin 
& Park, 1999). Even if funding among affiliates is made on competitive terms, such as in the external market, external 
financing may fail to raise funds irrespective of the conditions due to information asymmetry. In this regard, securing 
capital from affiliates can be advantageous for business groups (Park & Jung, 2011). In addition, if long-term profitable 
businesses are in temporary financial distress, management activities can be continued by financing through the 
internal capital market. Therefore, it is possible to distribute the risk not only between companies but also over time 
through the internal capital market. As a result, investors' investment risk is reduced, thereby enhancing firm value 
and stock price of affiliates (Bae et al. 2006). 
 
The existence of the internal capital market has negative aspects that facilitate the tunneling and support of insolvent 
affiliates (Johnson, Laporta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, 2000). In other words, the controlling shareholders of large 
business groups can maximize control over affiliates through the pyramid structure and the cross-shareholding, and 
allocate funds in favor of themselves through the internal capital market (Almeida & Wolfenzon, 2006).  
 
Previous studies have suggested two theoretical perspectives on the inducement of internal fund transactions by large 
business groups (Yoon, 2004). From the viewpoint of information asymmetry, Alchian (1969) has argued that the 
efficiency of allocating funds to the entire corporate group can be improved by avoiding information asymmetry of 
the external financial market through internal fund transactions. If the transaction cost in the external capital market 
due to information asymmetry is high, the internal capital market can be used to reduce costs. Khanna and Palepu 
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(2000) have also argued that the internal capital market provides an opportunity for low-cost financing to affiliates in 
emerging countries where funding costs are high due to insufficient external capital markets. Thus, if the controlling 
shareholders of large business groups have more information than outside investors, it can allocate funds to affiliates 
with good investment opportunities for the efficient allocation of funds throughout the group (Stein, 1997). In addition, 
when firms use internal capital markets, it is less likely that important information about the firm will be divulged to 
the external capital market (Yoon, 2004). In the presence of such information asymmetry, the internal capital market 
can be used to increase the efficiency of the group as a whole and to increase the earning of each affiliate. 
 
On the other hand, from the viewpoint of agent theory, the internal capital market may contain serious structural 
inefficiency. Scharfstein and Stein (2000) have argued that internal capital markets can lead to ‘socialistic subsidies’ 
in which business units with low investment opportunities and low productivity receive funding from business units 
with good investment opportunities. Rajan et al. (2000) also found that diversified firms tend to transfer resources 
from large business units with high profitability to business units with low investment opportunities. Claessens et al. 
(2002) identified that internal capital markets in emerging markets with a big wedge distress resulting from their 
complex ownership structure, such as pyramid structures and cross-shareholding, can exacerbate the agency problem 
between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. In other words, there is the possibility that the controlling 
shareholder can transfer resources of the business group to affiliates that maximize their own private utility by using 
voting rights that exceed their ownership. This implies that the internal fund transactions of a large business group can 
profit the controlling shareholders at the expense of the minority shareholders (Yoon, 2004). 
 
As previously mentioned, the internal capital markets, which is one of the most important characteristics of a large 
business group, are expected to vary in efficiency depending on ex ante incentives of controlling shareholders. In other 
words, if the motivation of the internal fund transaction is to mitigate imperfections of the market such as information 
asymmetry, it will enhance the efficiency of the entire business group. On the other hand, if the internal capital market 
is guided by incentives related to agency costs, such as securing control of controlling shareholders or detaching 
minority shareholders, it will result in undermining the efficiency of the business group. 
 
2.1.2 Investment Efficiency of Large Business Groups 
 
Previous studies on the internal capital market of large business groups have focused on one of the two incentives of 
the controlling shareholders discussed above and have studied whether the internal capital market is efficient. Some 
of these prior studies have discussed the efficiency of internal capital markets in relation to investment efficiency. 
 
Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990) pointed out the inefficiency of internal capital markets, and argued that the 
diversification firms reduces their firm value by showing the excess investment behavior using the funds to be paid to 
the shareholders. Scharfstein and Stein (2000) which conducted research on US composite companies found that 
diversified firms have lower investment levels than independent firms in industries with high investment opportunities, 
while diversified firms have higher investment levels than independent firms in industries with low investment 
opportunities. They interpreted these findings as suggesting that internal capital markets may hinder investment 
efficiency. 
 
Stein (1997) has argued that funds are transferred from business units with significant funds available but with fewer 
investment opportunities compared with business units with greater investment opportunities. Yoon (2004) analyzed 
the direction of support in the internal capital markets of Korea’s 5 largest chaebols and found that firms with large 
investment opportunities, as measured using Tobin’s Q received funding from small firms with low investment 
opportunities. In addition, Claessens et al. (2002) found that newly-emerging affiliates experiencing rapid growth 
received funding from slower-growth affiliates. Based on these results, they argue that large business groups allocate 
internal funds according to growth potential for efficient allocation. 
 
Analytical results concerning the investment efficiency of large business groups in Korea also contain mixed results. 
Kim (2011) suggests that firms in the business group invested more during the Korean foreign exchange crisis in 1998 
but had lower profitability, and that investment efficiency was low due to a large amount of investment did not lead 
to higher profitability. Lee (2013) analyzed the factors affecting the allocation of internal funds to manufacturing 
companies belonging to the Korean chaebols. Results showed that there is a significant negative relationship between 
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relative investment opportunities and internal fund allocation for chaebols. And as a result of this ineffective allocation 
of internal funds, the stock price return and the asset return rate of affiliated firms were found to be negatively affected. 
Cho and Kim (2013) also reported that companies belonging to a large business group were more likely to feature 
over-investment from related parties than those that do not belong to a large business group. 
 
In contrast, Kim (2012) has argued that affiliates of a large business group have high investment efficiency due to 
affiliates of a large business group conduct more active investment and enhanced profitability from results of the 
empirical analysis using data following the Korean foreign exchange crisis. Lee et al. (2010) also found that following 
the Korean foreign exchange crisis, the over-investment tendency of large business group affiliates decreased. Kim 
(2010) suggests that the internal capital market exists in the chaebol even following the Korean foreign exchange 
crisis, and that many investments are made. Also, these investments used internal funds rather than external financing, 
and had a higher relation with firm value than comparative companies' investments. Yim et al. (2014) showed that 
firms of large business groups do not over-invest in comparison with other firms in the situation of high incentive to 
invest excessively, but invest excessively in conditions in which under-investment incentives are high. 
 
As noted, studies on investment efficiency of large business groups feature mixed results. In addition, most related 
studies do not directly consider the role of internal capital markets, which is an important characteristic affecting the 
investment of large business groups. Even if the existence of the internal capital market was taken into consideration, 
it seems that the prior motivation in which the controlling shareholder uses the internal capital market was not 
distinguished. It is also important to understand not only post-performance but also ex ante incentive in judging the 
efficiency of internal fund transactions (Yoon 2004). Therefore, it is necessary to take into consideration the internal 
capital market and to consider ex ante incentive of the controlling shareholders in using the internal capital market in 
evaluating the investment efficiency of the large business group.  
 
This study examines the effects of the internal capital market on investment efficiency of large business groups through 
total payables to related parties. In addition, we analyze the effect of ex ante motivation of controlling shareholder, 
which is represented by the divergence between the cash flow rights and voting rights of controlling 
shareholders(hereafter, wedge), on the relationship between the internal capital market and the investment efficiency 
of large business groups. 
 
2.1.3 Literature Review on the Wedge 
 
Wedge is a useful tool to clearly determine the intention of allocating internal funds within the Korean chaebol (Lee 
2013). If the controlling shareholder has voting rights that exceed ownership, the benefit of the decision will 
correspond to the voting right, but the risk associated with it will be borne only by ownership (Fan & Wong 2002). 
As a result, controlling shareholders have incentives to make decisions that maximize their private benefits in firms 
with a big wedge. In other words, depending on the wedge, the interests of the controlling shareholder and the decision-
making behavior may differ. 
 
Prior researches have suggested that the bigger wedge, the more opportunistic behavior of controlling shareholders 
results. LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silannes & Shleifer (1999) found that in the case of East Asian countries, including Korea, 
the controlling shareholders exercise control over ownership through cross-shareholding and the pyramid ownership 
structure. Fan & Wong (2002) reported that the controlling shareholder of firms with a big wedge is likely to extract 
the wealth of external minority shareholders, and accordingly, the bigger wedge, the more the information effect of 
earnings decreases. 
 
Kim (2008) has presented results that decision-making at the business group level and the wedge of the whole business 
group directly affects decisions of individual affiliated companies. Lee, Chun & Kim (2012) confirmed that as the 
wedge increases, the real activities earnings management increases even after controlling ownership. On this basis, 
they argue that the pursuit of opportunistic self-interests by controlling shareholders is enhanced by the separation of 
cash flow rights and voting rights. Seo, Lee & Park (2013) suggested that the bigger wedge, the greater the 
management forecast bias. 
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These studies show that the wedge is affecting various aspects of accounting transparency. This means that the wedge 
may significantly reflect the private motivation of the controlling shareholder. Therefore, as Lee (2013) has identified, 
the wedge is considered to be a useful tool to properly distinguish the motivation of controlling shareholders related 
to the use of internal capital markets.  
 
2.2 Hypothesis Development 
 
As previously discussed prior studies on the investment efficiency of large business group companies have presented 
mixed results. In addition, previous studies have frequently used a methodology that simply compares the average 
investment level or management performance of large business groups and control groups, and does not control other 
factors that may affect investment levels or performance (Kim, 2011; Kim, 2012; Lee et al. 2010). In addition  a 
number of studies have suggested the existence of an internal fund market as one of the most important characteristics 
of a large business group, and explain the role of the internal fund market in relation to investment (Shin & Park, 
1999; Scharfstein & Stein, 2000; Stein, 1997; Park & Jung, 2011; Yoon, 2004). However, few studies have directly 
considered the impacts of the internal funding market on investment decisions. 
 
Therefore, this study first examines the effect of funding levels of internal capital market on investment efficiency, 
which means an appropriate amount of funding is realize.  
 
Previous studies have suggested that internal capital markets of large business groups may have a positive impact on 
investment efficiency. Shin and Park (1999) argued that Korean chaebols are less sensitive to investment-cash flow 
sensitivity than non-chaebols, and that these results are due to the internal capital market of Korean chaebols. Kim 
(2014) found that reduced investment resulting from conservatism is eased by the internal fund market that exists 
within large business groups. Kim (2010) reported that large business groups have more investment than non-chaebols 
due to the presence of internal capital markets. In this large business group, the internal capital market can increase 
the financial flexibility of the company and reduce financial constraints. In addition, there is the possibility to allocate 
internal funds effectively for investment and increase the value of the whole business group (Khanna & Palepu, 2000; 
Stein 1997). 
 
However, there are studies that suggest that the internal capital market can function inefficiently and negatively affect 
firm value. This problem can be caused mainly by the agent problem between the controlling shareholder and the 
external minority shareholder. In other words, from the viewpoint of agent theory, the internal capital market may 
have structural inefficiency. The controlling shareholders of chaebol firms can exercise their voting rights with greater 
effect higher than their ownership through pyramid structure and cross-shareholding, and have the possibility of over-
investing for constructing an empire by opportunistically using internal funds existing in a large business group. In 
this process, there is a possibility of ‘socialist subsidies’ to transfer internal funds from a business unit with excellent 
investment opportunities to a business unit with poor investment opportunities (Rajan et al. 2000; Scharfsten & Stein, 
2000; Lee, 2013). There is also the possibility of tunneling to relocate wealth to a company with a high controlling 
shareholder (Bae et al. 2006). As such, controlling shareholders are likely to take advantage of the internal capital 
market and try to take over wealth of minority shareholders or try to invest constructively in the empire. Therefore, 
funding through internal capital markets is expected to have a negative impact on investment efficiency.  
 
So we try to analyze the effects of internal capital markets on investment efficiency by restricting the research subjects 
to large business groups and measuring the size of the funding through the internal capital market as the total payables 
to the related parties. For this, the hypothesis is set as follows. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Ceteris paribus, as the total payables to the related parties increase, investment efficiency decreases. 
 
Hypothesis 1 examines the effects of the internal capital market on the investment efficiency of a large business group. 
However, the effects of the internal capital market on investment efficiency may differ depending on the incentives 
of the controlling shareholder (Yoon, 2004). In other words, if the internal fund transaction is initiated due to incentives 
to compensate for market imperfections such as information asymmetry, it can contribute to enhancing the efficiency 
of the whole business group (Alchian, 1969; Khanna & Palepu, 2000; Stein, 1997). Therefore, it will have a positive 
effect on the investment efficiency of companies belonging to a large business group. On the other hand, if the 
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controlling shareholder utilizes the internal capital market in the incentive related to the agent cost to offset the 
minority shareholder's wealth such as securing the dominance or private use, it will act as a factor to undermine the 
efficiency of business group. (Claessens et al. 2002; Rajan et al. 2000; Scharfstein & Stein, 2000). In this case, the use 
of the internal capital market is expected to have an adverse effect on the investment efficiency of companies belonging 
to a large business group.   
 
Therefore, it is necessary to evaluate the investment efficiency of a large business group considering both the internal 
capital market which may have a significant influence on the investment decisions of the large business group and ex 
ante incentives of the controlling shareholder for utilization of the internal capital market. This study examines the 
effect of the incentive for internal capital markets on the relationship between internal capital markets and investment 
efficiency. To this end, we analyze whether the relation between the total payables to the related parties and the 
investment efficiency is differentiated according to the wedge.  
 
The wedge is a useful tool for determining the intention of allocating internal funds within Korean chaebols (Lee 
2013). The controlling shareholders of a large business group can secure voting rights of a greater proportion than the 
dividend level by using the pyramid structure or the cross-shareholding. The greater the gap between ownership and 
voting rights, results in shareholders pursuing private earnings using the internal capital market. 
 
As the wedge is increase, the controlling shareholder can build a trench from the threat of external management control 
(Bebchuk, Reinier & Triantis, 2000), the quality of financial reporting is lower and information asymmetry becomes 
larger (Kim & Yi, 2006). Furthermore, in the case of a company with a big wedge, the controlling shareholder is likely 
to try to invest constructively in the empire irrespective of firm value because the controlling power is strong but the 
liability is small. Therefore, there is the possibility of transferring funds from the internal capital market to companies 
with a big wedge and utilizing for private use or low-profit investments. 
 
On the other hand, in the case of a low degree of wedge, the controlling shareholder has ownership corresponding to 
the voting right, and thus the degree of agreement with the minority shareholder becomes higher. These companies 
can expect to provide investment funds using the internal capital market if there is a lack of investment funds available. 
In addition, if the wedge is low and the agent problem with minority shareholders is low, the controlling shareholder 
will only invest if the investor is confident about the investment. In other words, there is the possibility that it will not 
carry out over-investment that may adversely affect long-term firm value. Therefore, it is expected that funding 
through the internal capital market will improve investment efficiency. In order to verify the above discussion, 
hypothesis 2 is set as follows. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Ceteris paribus, in the case of companies with a big wedge, the higher total payables to the related 
parties, the lower the investment efficiency. 
 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
3.1 Methodology and Variable Definitions  
 
3.1.1 Measurement of Investment Efficiency  
 
Tobin (1969) has argued that investment opportunities can be measured as a marginal Q, and McNichols and Stubben 
(2008) proposed the following appropriate investment equation based on Tobin(1969)'s argument. 
 𝐼𝑁𝑉$,& = 𝛼) + 𝛽,𝑄$,&., + 𝛽/𝑄$,&., ∗ 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒2$,&., + 𝛽9𝑄$,&., ∗ 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒3$,&., + 𝛽;𝑄$,&., ∗𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒4$,&., + 𝛽=𝑂𝐶𝐹$,& + 𝛽A𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ$,&., + 𝛽F𝐼𝑁𝑉$,&., + 𝜀$,& (1) 
 
where 
 
INV: cash flow from investing activities in year t divided by tangible assets at the end of year t-1 
Q: Tobin’s Q 
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Q*Quartile2(Quartile3, Quartile4): 1 if Qi,t−1 is in the second(third, fourth) quartile of its industry-year 
distribution, or 0 
OCF: operating cash flow in year t divided by tangible assets at the end of year 
t-1 
Growth: natural log of total assets at the end of year t−1 divided by total assets at 
the end of year t−2. 𝜀: residuals 
 
McNichols & Stubben (2008) included asset growth at the beginning of the year and investment in the prior year in 
the equation to compensate for potential measurement errors in the traditional Tobin’s Q. They also included an 
incremental coefficient for the quartiles of Q to mitigate the assumption that the coefficient of Tobin’s Q is the same 
in each industry-year. The residual in Equation (1) implies an inefficient investment. This means that the larger the 
absolute value of the residual, the greater the investment inefficiency. In this study, we used the non-optimal 
investment level (absXINV), which is measured as the absolute value of the value obtained by subtracting the actual 
investment level from the optimal investment level estimated by Equation (1), as a proxy for the investment efficiency. 
Specifically, the above Equation (1) is estimated for each industry sample except the sample of large business groups 
by industry-year. The estimated coefficients were applied to the sample of large business groups to calculate the 
appropriate investment level for each company and year. Finally, after subtracting the actual investment level, the 
absolute value was applied to calculate the non-optimal investment level (absXINV). 
 
3.1.2 Regression Model 
 
To test H1 of this study, we used the following Equation (2).  
 𝑎𝑏𝑠𝑋𝐼𝑁𝑉& = 𝛼) + 𝛽,𝑇𝑃𝑅𝑃& + 𝛽/𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸& + 𝛽9𝐿𝐸𝑉& + 𝛽;𝑅𝑂𝐴& + 𝛽S𝐹𝐶𝐹&., + 𝐼𝑁𝐷	𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 +𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝜀& (2) 
 
where 
 
absXINV: abnormal investment level (absolute value of residual estimated through Equation (1)) 
TPRP: total payables (=borrowings and other payables) to related parties / total assets at year’s beginning 
SIZE: a natural logarithm of total assets 
LEV: total liabilities / total assets 
ROA: return on asset 
FCF: free cash flow at year t-1 / total assets at the end of year t−2 
 
[(net income + depreciation expense - change in fixed assets - change in net working capital) / total assets at year’s 
beginning] 
 
IND Dummy: dummy variables for industry 
Year Dummy: dummy variables for year 
ε: residuals 
 
The dependent variable in Eq. (2) is absXINV, which indicates the abnormal investment level, and the independent 
variable is TPRP, which represent the total payables to the related parties.2 If funding through related party transactions 
improves investment efficiency, we expect β1 would have a negative (-) value, otherwise β1 is expected to have a 
positive (+) value. In addition, we included firm size (SIZE), debt ratio (LEV), return on asset (ROA), and free cash 
flow for the previous year (FCF) as control variables. These variables have been reported to affect the investment 
decisions of firms in previous studies. 
																																								 																				
2 In this study, total payables to the related parties are used as a proxy for measuring the level of funding through internal capital markets. Current 
accounting standards (K-IFRS) require disclosure of information on transactions, receivables and payables when there is a transaction between 
related parties. Therefore, it is expected that it will be possible to determine the degree of funding through the internal capital market of a large 
business groups through information on receivables and payables among related parties. Specifically, total payables to related parties were measured 
by dividing the sum of borrowings and other payables to the related parties by the total assets. 
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In order to test Hypothesis 2 that the effect of funding through internal capital markets on investment efficiency will 
be different depending on incentives of controlling shareholders, we include TPRP and the interaction variable of 
TPRP and WEDGEdum to the following Equation (3). 
 𝑎𝑏𝑠𝑋𝐼𝑁𝑉& = 𝛼) + 𝛽,𝑇𝑃𝑅𝑃& + 𝛽/𝑊𝐸𝐷𝐺𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑚& + 𝛽9𝑇𝑃𝑅𝑃 ∗ 𝑊𝐸𝐷𝐺𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑚& + 𝛽;𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸& + 𝛽S𝐿𝐸𝑉& +𝛽A𝑅𝑂𝐴& + 𝛽F𝐹𝐶𝐹&., + 𝐼𝑁𝐷	𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 +	𝜀& (3) 
 
where 
 
absXINV: abnormal investment level (absolute value of residual estimated through Equation (1)) 
TPRP: total payables (=borrowings and other payables) to the related parties / total assets at year 
beginning 
WEDGEdum: 1 if wedge is greater than the median, 0 otherwise [WEDGE: (voting right – cash flow right) / 
(number of common stock – number of treasury stock)] 
SIZE: a natural logarithm of total assets 
LEV: total liabilities / total assets 
ROA: return on assets  
FCF: free cash flow at year t-1 / total assets at the end of year t−2 
 
[(net income + depreciation expense - change in fixed assets - change in net working capital) / total assets at year’s 
beginning] 
 
IND Dummy: dummy variables for industry 
Year Dummy: dummy variables for year 
ε: residuals 
 
In order to measure the relative level of wedge, we set the dummy variable to 1 if the wedge of the individual firm is 
greater than the median of the sample, and 0 otherwise. Similar to many previous studies (Kim, Kim & Kim, 2011), 
we define wedge as the difference between the voting right and the cash flow right of the controlling shareholder in a 
large business group. The voting rights are the shares that can be actually exercised by the controlling shareholder in 
a large business group, and they are measured by adding the percentage of the shares of the controlling shareholder 
and the relatives, executives, non-profit corporations, and affiliated companies. The cash flow rights are the percentage 
of equity shares owned by the controlling shareholder and relatives. 
 
The main interest variable of Equation (3) is TPRP*WEDGEdum which is the interaction variable between the 
variable (TPRP) of total payables to the related parties and the dummy variable (WEDGEdum) of the wedge. If the 
coefficient (β3) of TPRP*WEDGEdum shows a significant positive value, Hypothesis 2 is supported.  
 
3.2 Sample Selection 
 
The purpose of this study is to analyze the effect of internal capital markets on investment efficiency of large business 
groups. Therefore, a sample was selected from companies belonging to a large business group designated by the Korea 
Fair Trade Commission. The sample period was 2005-2012, and the samples were selected according to the conditions 
presented in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1. Total sample selection 
Sample characteristics Number of firm-year observations 
Non-financial firms belonging to a large business group 1,783 
Less: Firms whose fiscal year does not end in December 31 (180) 
Firms that are not listed on the KOSPI market (308) 
Uunavailable data (106) 
Total 1,189 
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Banking and financial institutions were excluded from the sample due to the different accounting standard and 
financial statements compared with non-financial firms. Also, to control for the effects of different fiscal year-ends, 
we excluded firms whose fiscal year does not end on December 31. And we include only listed companies on the 
KOSPI to control for market differences.  
 
Companies belong to large business group companies and wedge data were collected from Korea Fair Trade 
Commission's "Online Provision of Enterprises Information", and other financial data was extracted from the TS2000 
database (Korea Listed Companies Association). In order to minimize the effects of outliers on the analytical results, 
we remove the top and bottom 1% of observations from the sample by performing a winsorization at the 1% level. 
The final sample consists of 1,189 firm-year observation. 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation  
 
Table 2 displays descriptive statistics of the main variables used for hypotheses testing in this study. The mean 
(median) of the abnormal investment level (absXINV) is 0.1849 (0.1091). This means that the average level of 
abnormal investment of sample companies accounts for 18% of the tangible assets at year beginning. The mean 
(median) of TPRP is 0.0281 (0.0124). As a result, the sample companies are comprised of 2.7% of total assets from 
the affiliates in the business group. The mean (median) of the divergence between the cash flow rights and voting 
rights of controlling shareholders (WEDGE) is 0.2679 (0.2693), and the average voting right exceeding cash flow 
right was about 27%. Other control variables, such as SIZE, LEV, ROA, and FDF, are similar to previous studies. 
 
 
Table 2. Summary of descriptive statistics 
Variables Mean Min Q1 Median Q3 Max S.D. 
absXINV 0.1849 0.0021 0.0494 0.1091 0.2064 1.8377 0.2658 
TPRP 0.0281 0.0000 0.0031 0.0124 0.0351 0.2456 0.0415 
WEDGE 0.2679 0.0000 0.0596 0.2693 0.4037 0.7901 0.2059 
WEDGEdum 0.4996 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.5002 
SIZE 21.2512 17.8500 20.1536 21.2675 22.3773 24.6400 1.4914 
LEV 0.4871 0.0392 0.3344 0.5130 0.6312 0.9317 0.1999 
ROA 0.0442 -0.2552 0.0110 0.0448 0.0856 0.2248 0.0759 
FCF 0.0183 -0.4902 -0.0365 0.0280 0.0908 0.4382 0.1376 
Number of observations: 1,189  
The definitions of the variables are as follows: TPRP = total payables(=borrowings and other payables) to the related parties / total assets at year 
beginning; WEDGE = (voting right –cash flow right) / (number of common stock – number of treasury stock); WEDGEdum = 1 if wedge is greater 
than the median, 0 otherwise; SIZE = a natural logarithm of total assets; LEV = total liabilities / total assets; ROA= return on assets; FCF = free 
cash flow at year t-1 / total assets at the end of year t−2[(net income + depreciation expense - change in fixed assets - change in net working capital) 
/ total assets at year’s beginning]; IND Dummy = dummy variables for industry; Year Dummy = dummy variables for year; ε : residuals. 
 
 
Table 3 provides the Pearson’s correlation between the variables used in the empirical analysis. In Table 3, the 
abnormal investment level (absXINV), which is a dependent variable of Equations 1 and 2, showed a positive (+) 
correlation with the total payables to the related parties (TPRP). This suggests that investment efficiency decreases as 
the size of funding from related parties increases. On the other hand, the abnormal investment level (absXINV) does 
not have significant correlation with the cash flow rights and voting rights of controlling shareholders (WEDGE). 
However, since correlation analysis is a univariate analysis in which the influence of other variables is uncontrolled, 
multiple regression analysis is needed to clarify the relationship between variables.  
 
As a result of the variance inflation factor (VIF) in order to confirm the possibility of multi-collinearity between the 
variables used in the analysis, the value of all variables was less than 4. Therefore, it is judged that there is no distortion 
of the result due to the problem of multi-collinearity.  
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Table 3. Pearson’s correlations between key variables 
 absXINV TPRP WEDGE WEDGEdum SIZE LEV ROA FCF 
absXINV 1.0000 0.0750*** -0.0192 -0.0155 -0.1265*** -0.0084 0.0146 0.0616** 
TPRP  1.0000 0.0988*** 0.1157*** 0.1471*** 0.2094*** -0.0207 -0.0406 
WEDGE   1.0000 0.8386*** -0.2355*** 0.0739** -0.1195*** -0.1406*** 
WEDGEdum    1.0000 -0.2336*** 0.0794*** -0.1253*** -0.1241*** 
SIZE     1.0000 0.1634*** 0.1384*** 0.0471 
LEV      1.0000 -0.4172*** -0.3212*** 
ROA       1.0000 0.3133*** 
FCF        1.0000 
*, **, *** significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Please refer to the note in Table 2 for the definitions of the variables. 
 
 
4.2 Regression Analysis 
 
Our regression results of Equation (2) for testing Hypothesis 1 are presented in Table 4. The regression coefficient of 
total payables to the related parties (TPRP) is 0.6636, indicating a significant positive value at the 1% level. This is 
consistent with the hypothesis, and this implies that the larger the size of funding in the internal capital market, the 
worse the investment efficiency of the companies belonging to the large business group. This suggests that the internal 
fund transaction by large business groups may be conducted inefficiently in incentives to support poor subsidiaries or 
to transfer the wealth from external minority shareholders. 
 
 
Table 4. Results of regression: The effect total payables to the related parties on investment efficiency 𝑎𝑏𝑠𝑋𝐼𝑁𝑉& = 𝛼) + 𝛽,𝑇𝑃𝑅𝑃& + 𝛽/𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸& + 𝛽9𝐿𝐸𝑉& + 𝛽;𝑅𝑂𝐴& + 𝛽S𝐹𝐶𝐹&., + 𝐼𝑁𝐷	𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝜀& (2) 
Variables Predicted Sign Coefficient t-value 
Intercept +/- 0.7529 6.59*** 
TPRP + 0.6636 3.54*** 
SIZE - -0.0260 -4.76*** 
LEV - -0.0572 -1.22 
ROA - 0.1407 1.21 
FCF + 0.0846 1.40 
IND Dummy  Included 
Year Dummy  included 
F value  6.29 
Adj. R2  0.0856 
No. of Observations  1,189 
*, **, *** significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Please refer to the note in Table 2 for the definitions of the variables. 
 
 
The results of Hypothesis 2 are shown in Table 5. Hypothesis 2 was verified through Equation (3), WEDGEdum and 
TPRP*WEDGEdum added to Equation (2), and the mean centering value3 of the interaction variables was used to 
control the multi-collinearity problem caused by the inclusion of interaction variables. Table 5 also shows the results 
of the under-investment sample (XINV<0) and the over-investment sample (XINV>0), as well as the results of the 
full sample. The deterioration of investment efficiency can be divided into under-investment and over-investment. We 
examined the effects of under-investment and over-investment internal capital. 
 
The analysis results of the full sample show that the regression coefficient of TPRP is positive (0.1129, but not 
statistically significant, whereas the regression coefficient of TPRP*WEDGEdum is 0.8835, which is significant at 
the 5% level. In other words, for firms with a big wedge, the degree of increase in abnormal investment level was 
relatively large as the total payables to the related parties increased. Therefore, the deterioration in investment 
efficiency due to the increase in the total payables to the related parties can be interpreted as caused mainly by the 
																																								 																				
3 TPRP*WEDGEdum is the value of the total payables to the related parties of an individual company, which is subtracted from the sample average, 
by interacting with the dummy variables of the wedge. 
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group with a big wedge. As a result of supporting the hypothesis of this study, it suggests that the effect of the internal 
capital market of large business groups on investment efficiency may be differentiated by the incentives of controlling 
shareholder represented by the wedge.4 
 
In other words, in the case of a company with a big wedge, the controlling shareholder has a strong control over the 
company, but the responsibility for the control is low so that the pursuit of the shareholder's private interest is easy 
(Bebchuk et al., 2000; Kim & Yi, 2006; Lee, 2013). This can be interpreted as reducing investment efficiency by being 
used for constructive investment of the empire irrelevant to the firm value or private use of the controlling shareholder. 
On the other hand, if the wedge is low and the controlling shareholder has the cash flow rights corresponding to the 
voting rights, the degree of agreement with the external minority shareholders becomes higher. For this reason, unlike 
the group with a big wedge, it seems that funding through the internal capital market does not lead to the deterioration 
of investment efficiency.  
 
On the other hand, the analysis of the under-investment sample and the over-investment sample shows that the 
regression coefficient of TPRP*WEDGEdum is not significant in the under-investment sample. However, in the case 
of the over- investment sample, the regression coefficient of TPRP*WEDGEdum shows a statistically significant 
positive value at the level of 5%. Thus, funding for firms a big wedge seems to reduce investment efficiency by 
increasing over-investment rather than under-investment. In other words, companies with a big wedge can be 
interpreted as showing over-investment behavior by using the funds supported through the internal capital market due 
to incentive to build an empire, which leads to deteriorated investment efficiency. 
 
 
Table 5. Results of regression: The effect of total payables to the related parties due to the wedge on investment efficiency 𝑎𝑏𝑠𝑋𝐼𝑁𝑉& = 𝛼) + 𝛽,𝑇𝑃𝑅𝑃& + 𝛽/𝑊𝐸𝐷𝐺𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑚& + 𝛽9𝑇𝑃𝑅𝑃 ∗ 𝑊𝐸𝐷𝐺𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑚& + 𝛽;𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸& + 𝛽S𝐿𝐸𝑉& + 𝛽A𝑅𝑂𝐴& + 𝛽F𝐹𝐶𝐹&., +𝐼𝑁𝐷	𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 +	𝜀& (3) 
Variables Predicted Sign 
Full Sample Reduced Sample (XINV < 0) (XINV > 0) 
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
Intercept +/- 0.8191 6.75*** 0.6379 4.29*** 1.1171 5.47*** 
TPRP + 0.1129 0.36 -0.0472 -0.13 0.2962 0.57 
WEDGEdum + -0.0158 -0.98 -0.0298 -1.52 0.0014 0.05 
TPRP*WEDGEdum + 0.8835 2.33** 0.5828 1.25 1.2390 1.97** 
SIZE - -0.0283 -4.95*** -0.0180 -2.57** -0.0452 -4.74*** 
LEV - -0.0537 -1.14 -0.0843 -1.51 -0.0181 -0.22 
ROA - 0.1461 1.25 0.3718 2.59*** -0.1153 -0.59 
FCF + 0.0762 1.26 -0.1551 -2.06** 0.3528 3.53*** 
IND Dummy  Included Included Included 
Year Dummy  Included Included Included 
F value  6.06*** 5.44*** 3.11*** 
Adj. R2  0.0893 0.1281 0.0898 
No. of Observations  1,189 697 492 
*, **, *** significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Please refer to the note in Table 2 for the definitions of the variables. 
 
 
4.3 Additional Analysis 
 
4.3.1 Analysis Using Traditional Tobin’s Q Investment Function 
 
In the above analysis, we use the abnormal investment level estimated by using the model of McNichols & Stubben 
(2008) as a proxy for investment efficiency. We re-test Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 using the abnormal investment 
																																								 																				
4 As a result of mean and median difference analysis between the big and small wedge groups, it is found that the mean and median of the total 
payables to the related parties in the group with a big wedge are significantly higher than those of the groups with low wedge. Therefore, it seems 
that firms with a big wedge are not effectively investing such funds even though they receive a relatively large amount of internal funding as 
compared to the firms with low wedge. This suggests that controlling shareholders are increasing the level of funding for firms with a big wedge 
as means of private utility.	
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level estimated as a traditional Tobin’s Q investment function in order to increase the robustness of analysis results. 
The traditional Tobin’s Q investment function is shown in Equation (4), and the abnormal investment level is measured 
consistent with McNichols & Stubben (2008). 
 𝐼𝑁𝑉$,& = 𝛼) + 𝛽,𝑄$,&., + 𝛽/𝑂𝐶𝐹$,& + 𝜀$,& (4) 
 
INV: Cash flow from investing activities in year t divided by tangible assets at the end of year t-1 
Q: Tobin’s Q 
OCF: Operating cash flow in year t divided by tangible assets at the end of year t-1 
ε: Residuals 
 
Table 6 shows the results using the traditional Tobin’s Q investment function. First, the analysis of Hypothesis 1 
shows that β1 has a significant positive (+) value at the 10% level, which is not different from the analysis using 
McNichols & Stubben (2008) model. Therefore, even if the level of abnormal investment measured by the traditional 
Tobin’s Q investment function is used as a dependent variable, it can be confirmed that the analysis result does not 
change qualitatively. As a result of the re-test of Hypothesis 2, the regression coefficient (β3) of RPTT*WEDGEdum 
still shows a significant positive (+) value (at the 1% level). Thus, for firms with a big wedge, we can reaffirm that 
funding through internal capital markets further weakens investment efficiency. 
 
 
Table 6. Results of regression: Using traditional Tobin’s Q investment function as a proxy for investment efficiency 𝑎𝑏𝑠𝑋𝐼𝑁𝑉& = 𝛼) + 𝛽,𝑇𝑃𝑅𝑃& + 𝛽/𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸& + 𝛽9𝐿𝐸𝑉& + 𝛽;𝑅𝑂𝐴& + 𝛽S𝐹𝐶𝐹&., + 𝐼𝑁𝐷	𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝜀& (2) 𝑎𝑏𝑠𝑋𝐼𝑁𝑉& = 𝛼) + 𝛽,𝑇𝑃𝑅𝑃& + 𝛽/𝑊𝐸𝐷𝐺𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑚& + 𝛽9𝑇𝑃𝑅𝑃 ∗ 𝑊𝐸𝐷𝐺𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑚& + 𝛽;𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸& + 𝛽S𝐿𝐸𝑉& + 𝛽A𝑅𝑂𝐴& + 𝛽F𝐹𝐶𝐹&.,	+𝐼𝑁𝐷	𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 +	𝜀&  (3) 
Variables Predicted Sign 
Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
Intercept +/- 0.8079 7.82*** 0.8614 7.88*** 
TPRP + 0.6632 3.92*** -0.2016 -0.72 
WEDGEdum +   -0.0053 -0.36 
TPRP*WEDGEdum +   1.3490 3.96*** 
SIZE - -0.0320 -6.49*** -0.0336 -6.53*** 
LEV - 0.0168 0.39 0.0185 0.44 
ROA - 0.1754 1.66* 0.1892 1.8* 
FCF + 0.0852 1.56 0.0745 1.37 
IND Dummy  Included Included 
Year Dummy  Included Included 
F value  4.50*** 4.85*** 
Adj. R2  0.0582 0.0694 
No. of Observations  1,189 1,189 
*, **, *** significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Please refer to Table 2 for the definitions of the variables except for the following. absXINV is the abnormal investment level and is the absolute 
value of residual estimated through Equation (4), which is a traditional Tobin’s Q investment function. 
 
 
4.3.2 Analysis Using Net Payables to The Related Parties 
 
We used total payables to related parties as a proxy for the level of funding through the internal capital market. 
However, large business group companies may be able to provide funds to other affiliates while concurrently receiving 
funding from these affiliates. Table 7 shows the results of Hypothesis 2 using the net payables to the related parties as 
a proxy for the level of funding through the internal capital market. If the amount of payables to the related party is 
larger than the amount of the receivables, it means that the amount supported by the other companies in the group is 
relatively high, so that the funding from the internal capital market is high. Specifically, net payables to the related 
parties(NPRP) is measured by deducting loans and other receivables from borrowings and other payables to the related 
parties and dividing them by the total amount of receivables and payables to the related parties. Also, as in Table 5, 
NPRP*WEDGEdum is the mean centering value. 
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As shown in Table 7, the model using the abnormal investment level as a dependent variable as estimated by 
McNichols & Stubben (2008)'s investment model, found the regression coefficient of NPRP*WEDGEdum is 0.0427, 
showing that it is significantly positive at the 10% level. However, in the model using abnormal investment level 
estimated by the traditional Tobin’s Q investment function as a dependent variable, the regression coefficient of 
NPRP*WEDGEdum showed positive value but was not significant. In the case of firms a big wedge, we partially 
confirmed that the level of abnormal investment increases as the net payables to the related parties increase. This 
implies that the effect of the internal capital market on investment efficiency can be differentiated by the incentives 
of the controlling shareholder represented by the wedge, as in the analysis using the total payables to related parties. 
Furthermore, firms with low wedge suggest that funding through the internal capital market may improve the 
investment efficiency by eliminating the lack of investment funds for profitable investment. 
 
 
Table 7. Results of regression: Using net payables to the related parties as a proxy for level of funding through internal capital 
market 𝑎𝑏𝑠𝑋𝐼𝑁𝑉& = 𝛼) + 𝛽,𝑅𝑃𝑇𝑁𝐷& + 𝛽/𝑊𝐸𝐷𝐺𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑚& + 𝛽9𝑁𝑃𝑅𝑃 ∗ 𝑊𝐸𝐷𝐺𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑚& + 𝛽;𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸& + 𝛽S𝐿𝐸𝑉& + 𝛽A𝑅𝑂𝐴& + 𝛽F𝐹𝐶𝐹&., +𝐼𝑁𝐷	𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟	𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝜀 
Variables Predicted Sign 
McNichols & Stubben’s model Traditional Tobin’s Q investment function 
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
Intercept +/- 0.7472 6.05*** 0.7417 6.64*** 
TPRP + -0.0307 -1.86* -0.0381 -2.55** 
WEDGEdum + -0.0107 -0.66 -0.0008 -0.06 
TPRP*WEDGEdum + 0.0427 1.78* 0.0214 0.99 
SIZE - -0.0256 -4.41*** -0.0291 -5.56*** 
LEV - -0.0220 -0.47 0.0508 1.21 
ROA - 0.1531 1.31 0.1879 1.78* 
FCF + 0.0916 1.51 0.0969 1.77* 
IND Dummy  Included Included 
Year Dummy  Included Included 
F value  5.35*** 3.74*** 
Adj. R2  0.0777 0.0504 
No. of Observations  1,189 1,189 
*, **, *** significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Please refer to the note in Table 2 for the definitions of the variables except for the following. NPRP is net payables to the related parties and is 
measured by deducting loans and other receivables from borrowings and other payables to the related parties and dividing them by the total amount 
of receivables and payables to the related parties [= {(borrowings and other payables to the related parties) – (loans and other receivables to the 
related parties)} / (borrowings and other payables to the related parties + loans and other receivables to the related parties)]. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
This study examines whether the effects of funding through internal capital markets on investment efficiency is 
differentiated by the incentives of controlling shareholders as measured by the wedge.  
 
Large business groups in Korea have a profound impact on the domestic economy. These groups have been criticized 
for the concentration of economic power, collusive link between politics and business, and maximizing wealth of 
controlling shareholders, and have been subject to various regulations. On the other hand, large business groups are 
identified as having contributed to the development of the Korean economy through long-term and bold investment 
(Lee et al. 2010; Yim et al. 2014). Considering the influence of the large business group in the Korean economy and 
the conflicting perspectives concerning these groups, research related to large business groups has many implications. 
 
One of the important characteristics of large business groups is the existence of the internal capital market (Park & 
Jung 2011), Controlling shareholders are expected to use the internal capital market in the following two incentives: 
First, by using the internal capital market, information asymmetry existing in the external financial market can be 
avoided, thereby increasing the efficiency of allocating funds to the whole business groups (Alchian, 1969; Khanna 
& Palepu, 2000; Stein, 1997). Second, there is the possibility that the controlling shareholder may transfer internal 
funds in order to maximize the controlling shareholder’s private utility (Claessens et al. 2002; Scharfstein & Stein 
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2000; Yoon 2004). As a result, the efficiency of the internal capital markets of large business groups can be different 
due to these contradictory incentives of controlling shareholders.  
 
Previous studies have examined the efficiency of internal capital markets in relation to investment efficiency, but 
results of are inconsistent (Kim, 2011; Kim, 2012; Lee et al. 2010; Kim, 2010; Lee, 2013; Yim et al. 2014; Cho & 
Kim, 2013). In addition, most prior studies do not directly consider the role of internal capital markets, which may 
affect the investment of large business groups, nor does it distinguish between ex ante incentives of controlling 
shareholders using internal capital markets. This study examined the effects of the internal capital market of large 
business groups on investment efficiency through total payables to related parties and analyzed whether these effects 
are differentiated according to ex ante incentives of controlling shareholder represented by the wedge. 
 
The main results of the analysis of 1,189 firm-year observations collected from Korean firms listed on the Korea 
Composite Stock Price Index (KOSPI) belonging to large business groups designated by the Korea Fair Trade 
Commission from 2005 to 2012 are as follows. First, we find that the magnitude of internal funding, as measured by 
total payables to the related parties, is positively (+) associated with investment inefficiency. Second, the interaction 
variables of total payables to the related parties and the wedge have a significant positive (+) effect on investment 
inefficiency. In other words, the deterioration of investment efficiency due to the increase in total payables to the 
related parties was mainly caused by firms with a big wedge. Third, for the robustness of the results, we analyzed 
additionally using the abnormal investment level estimated as a traditional Tobin’s Q investment function and using 
the net payables to the related parties as a proxy for the size of the funding through the internal capital market. 
Equivalent results were obtained. As a result of additional analysis, the change of variables did not affect the results. 
 
This study provides additional evidence for previous studies on investment efficiency of large business groups by 
considering both the internal capital market and incentives for funding using the internal capital market., which are 
important factors affecting the investment of large corporate groups. Also, the results of this study are expected to 
provide implications for the regulatory policy of large business groups which have recently become a prominent issue 
in Korea.  
 
Meanwhile, this study measured the level of funding in the internal capital market through receivables and payables 
to the related parties such as borrowings and loans. There is the limitation in that the funding of companies belonging 
to large business groups can be achieved through the sale, purchase, and investment of assets. Also, there is the 
possibility that the empirical analysis model does not fully consider all variables, so there may be a problem concerning 
omitted variables. 
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